Tuesday, June 30, 2009

Pray Tell Me, Are Derivatives Good or Are They Bad?

For the past 30 odd years, derivatives have acted as the barometer of popular sentiment toward markets. In good times, they are praised as ingenious inventions that allow companies to save money in their finances. In bad times, they are scorned as the mysterious devices created to game the system. At all times, they are not understood. The level of discussion never goes beyond the derivatives-are-good/derivatives-are-bad platitudes.

This appalling insubstantiality is in full display again in the latest round of talks about the regulation of markets that, naturally, involves derivatives. In its latest research paper, the Bank of International Settlement likens markets to “pharmaceuticals” and argues that more potent drugs – that would be derivatives – should be made available only by prescription. (The analogy cannot be carried any further because that would imply that only very sick companies could use complex derivatives.) Sage of Omaha is on the record with this gem of a thought that derivatives are the “financial weapons of mass destruction”. George Soros thinks that some derivatives are good and some are bad and should be outlawed, exactly the sort of penetrating analysis one would expect from a money manager who wants to be known as an intellectual and a philosopher.

This past Friday, Floyd Norris of the New York Times picked up the subject. “In the world of derivatives, profit for dealers comes from complexity and secrecy.” After that dramatic lead sentence, he went on to assert that “even when derivatives do allow financial risks to be transferred, that is not always a good thing” because, he quoted a finance professor, derivatives in fact “shift risks from those who understand them a little to those who do not understand them at all.” Norris is among the more perceptive of the business reporters.

Speaking of those who do not understand derivatives at all, here is what I wrote in the opening paragraph of the Foreword to Vol. 2 of Speculative Capital:
Derivatives are the functional form that speculative capital assumes in the market. This form is fundamentally a bet. But like the bodies of the damned in Inferno whose deformity corresponds to the sort of sin they have committed, the particular composition of each derivative corresponds to the sort of opportunities that speculative capital intends to exploit. Arbitrage opportunities are many and varied; hence the confusing array of derivatives and the tortuous legal documentation that must accompany each.
I then added:
The subject of risks of derivatives is a virgin territory. That is not due to the dearth of attempts to exploit it. Quite the contrary; the mountain of material on the subject has few rivals in any discipline. But the territory of concern to us is in the realm of theory and thought, into which unthinking material cannot penetrate no matter what its size.
These lines were written over a decade ago. They remain as valid now as they were then.

Meanwhile, the crisis goes on.

Sunday, June 21, 2009

An Excerpt from Vol. 4: A Primer on Bond Mathematics (2 of 2)

In its original form, the equation FV = PV (1 + i) assumes nothing. It merely takes the facts of the transaction – $100 lent at 4% for one year, in our example – and calculates how much money is due to the end of the term. Of course, the lender, like all lenders, assumed that he would be paid back in full, otherwise he would not grant the loan. But that is the lender’s assumption and does not affect the equation. Even if the borrower defaults, the validity of the relation would stand, as it only calculates what should be due to the lender.

Things change when we solve the equation for the present value, PV:

PV = FV/(1 + i)

Mathematically, all we did here was to rearrange the equation, a simple operation familiar to 6th graders. But that technical operation shifted the focus to the present value.

This emphasis and the name “present value” would confuse our borrower and lender. “What do you mean by the ‘present value’ of the loan?,” they would demand to know.

– “The present value is the current value of the loan: how much it is worth today.”

– “What do you mean by the ‘worth’ of the loan”?

–“That is how much the loan is worth! How can we say it? How much it cost the lender to finance the loan”

–“That is $100. It is the loan’s principal. Why do you call it the present value?”

But the present value is not the same as the principal. The new vocabulary is telling us that we are no longer in the private world of borrowing and lending between two individuals. Rather, we have entered the world of securities and markets. The relation PV = FV/(1+ i) expresses relations in the markets and presupposes them. Only then the concept of present value becomes meaningful.

To presuppose markets is to presuppose buyers and sellers. The new form of Eq. (1) assumes that when the creditor takes his IOU to markets, he will find Moneybag waiting for him, ready to buy the note at its “fair value”.

What happens if there are no buyers?

To answer that question, we must ask why and under what conditions would there be no buyers?

There could be two reasons; one particular, the other, general.

The particular reason has to do with the perceived “credit risk” of the individual security, credit risk being the risk that the borrower will fail to pay back the loan and interest on the due date. If there are concerns about our borrower’s ability to pay back the loan, Moneybag, like other potential buyers, will stay away. No one comes to market to suffer a loss, and with many securities to choose from, there is no reason to risk one’s capital on a risky bet.

Our creditor would react to this situation the only way sellers all over the world react when the demand for what they are selling softens: by discounting the price. Instead of asking $100, which is the note’s original “fair price”, he marks it down and offers it at say, $98.

In itself, this act of discounting is unremarkable. But something interesting happens on the technical side, when we substitute the new price in the PV equation. With the future value unchanged at $104 – it is the defining characteristic of the bond and cannot be altered – the one variable that must change is the rate i:

PV = FV/(1 +i)

98 = 104/(1+i), or:

i = 6.1%

Technically, this was expected. In equation FV = PV (1 + i), the bond price (PV) and interest rate i are inversely related. If rate increases, the price will decrease. Changing the order, it stands to reason that if price decreases, the rate will increase. This is no different than saying that if the area of the rectangle remains constant and its length decreases, then its width must increase.

Meanwhile, we have said nothing about interest rates in general. That is another way of saying that we assumed they remained unchanged. The increase in rate is therefore something specific to our particular security. That something is the borrower’s potentially deteriorating finances.

What is this rate? That is, what does 6.1% a year correspond to, or represent?

In the nomenclature of modern finance it means that if the borrower were to ask for additional loans, he would not be able to secure it at 4% and would have to pay 6.1%.

This conclusion is counter intuitive. Even primitive societies treat their vulnerable members with extra care. Certainly in the liberal democratic societies we are expected to see senior citizens, for example, on account of their reduced income, receive special discounts for a wide range of social and private services from transportation to movies. “Give me a break” is the cry of the hurt and vulnerable that demands a more lenient treatment. Obama administration’s Helping Families Save Their Homes Act fell squarely into this category before it was gutted out by the lobbyists.

In the case of the financially vulnerable, though, the fundamental relation of the bond mathematics dictates the opposite: if a borrower has trouble meeting his obligation, then interest rates on him must rise.

Such a “remedy” at once reveals the viewpoint of Eq. (1), which is that of finance capital. Far from being an abstract, neutral relation expressing a general truth, Eq. (1) expresses the power relation in a social structure in which finance capital dominates.

Under these conditions, the well being or survival of individual borrowers is not of concern – not because finance capital has “no heart” but because such matters are irrelevant. “So says the bond,” finance capital’s spokesman, Shylock, declares, further demanding that the judge second his view: “Doth it not, noble judge?” And when the judge asks him to bring a surgeon to attend Antonio's wounds lest he bleed to death in consequence of giving a pound of flesh, Shylock inquires: “Is it so nominated in the bond?” Therein lies the basis of the contract law which is the centerpiece of the Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. All the learned erudition the law scholars at Yale and Harvard and the pompous musings of the U.S. Supreme Court judges on the subject of contract law never go beyond the self-serving utterances of this usurer.

As finance capital tightens its grip on the economy, its viewpoint is presented as a universal truth: the less credit-worthy the borrower, the higher the interest rate he must pay. Michael Milken’s junk bond operation in the 1980s was based on this idea. A straight line connects him to the recent sub-prime mortgage fiasco.

(A reader in the comment section asked whether interest rate is always positive. That, too, is the question that finance capital floats. Setting aside some technical exceptions such as when a security “goes special” in the repo market, the interest rate is always positive in the sense that the lender will always charge the borrower; a negative interest rate means that a lender will pay you interest to borrow his money. This is prima facie absurd. However, if the rate is 4% and inflation is running at 5%, the lender presumably loses 1% when lending. It is in that sense that the interest rate for him is negative. That, needless to say, is also the viewpoint of finance capital.)

The subject of the borrower’s deteriorating finances has been extensively researched in finance. The borrower’s probability of default (PD) and the lender’s exposure at default (EAD) and his loss given default (LGD) are extensively studied. Google these terms to see what I mean.

But then there is the general case of why there might not be any buyers in the market. In the aftermath of the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008, the commercial paper market completely shut down.

Under this condition, no security, regardless of the financial health of the issuer or borrower, would find a buyer. The creditors holding the IOUs would cry in frustration: “But this security of mine is absolutely guaranteed to pay back $104 at maturity.” To which the market would reply by quoting the oft quoted line from The Godfather: It’s not personal Sonny!

Modern finance has nothing to offer on this topic. You will sooner find Taleban mullahs writing about distilling single malt whiskey than finance scholars of the Western liberal democracies writing about this subject – and for a good reason. The main pillar of modern finance, Equation (1), does not lend itself to even considering the question of the absence of buyers. Why there would be no buyers, i.e., why markets would break down, is something completely outside the realm of its consideration. In fact, the entire theoretical edifice of modern finance and economics is based on the assumption that every seller brings his own buyer to the market, a preposterous assumption that is refuted thousands of times a day every time a commercial is aired, an advertisement is posted, a sales call is made and a price is discounted. So in the aftermath of Lehman bankruptcy, when the CP market shut down, all the best and the brightest of finance in business and academia could offer was that buyers had “gone on strike”!

Why and under what condition buyers would disappear en masse from a market is the subject of Vol. 4 of Speculative Capital. The condition is the prerequisite for the realization of systemic risk, its trigger point.

It is under these conditions that the role and activities of the Federal Reserve call for a brief comment.

For the past several months, the Fed has been trying to reduce the interest rates and particularly, the mortgage rates. To that end, it has been buying Treasuries – that is called “quantitative easing” – and the agencies, the latter being the IOUs of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The logic is that buying the securities would increase the demand for them and thus, their price. (Remember supply and demand! If the price of IOUs increases, “their” interest rates would decrease.) The understanding of the members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve of the nature and role of interest rate in the country – and hundreds of analysts, economists, policy makers, ex-banker, MBAs and quants that they employ – boils down to this embarrassingly crude logic. Therefore, in the face of rates behaving in the most unexpected manner, they have nothing to say. “Learned helplessness” has become de rigeur.


The Fed, at the same time, is being assigned the role of supervising the financial system with the purpose of preventing a systemic collapse. But with its mechanical view of how markets work, it would not know why buyers might suddenly vanish. The subject of finance is not the psychology of buyers and sellers but the laws of movement of finance capital. This subject is not simply within the Fed’s theoretical ken.

The setup reminds me of an Iranian poem on the eve of the Mongolian attack on Iran. The poet wrote:

The king is drunk, the world is in chaos and the enemies are front and back;

It is well too obvious what will come out of this.

Sunday, June 14, 2009

An Excerpt from Vol. 4: A Primer on Bond Mathematics (1 of 2)

I am busy with Vol. 4 of Speculative Capital. Its subject keeps expanding because I digress. Each digression then proves to be the main subject. Here is a short excerpt on “bond mathematics” from the manuscript, with only minor editing for the blog, so you would see what I mean.

***

Consider a borrower who borrows $100 at the going rate of 4% a year for one year. As the evidence of his obligation to pay, he gives the creditor an IOU, a promissory note saying that, at the end of the year, he, the borrower, will pay back the original sum plus the accrued interest, for a total of $104. The calculus of the note is as follows:

100 + 100 x .04 = $104, or:

100 (1 + .04) = $104

The amount presently borrowed, $100, is the present value of the loan. The amount to be paid back in one year, $104, is its future value. If we designate these values by PV and FV, respectively, and let i stand for interest rate, we can generalize this relation as Eq. (1):

PV (1 + i) = FV

Eq. (1) is the fundamental relation of fixed income mathematics. It contains three parameters that uniquely define a debt instrument: principal, interest and maturity. In any lending and borrowing, you have to know how much you are lending or borrowing (principal), at what rate (interest) and for how long (maturity). (Maturity is hidden in Eq. (1) because we assumed it to be one year. This assumption has no bearing on our discussion.)

If, after lending the money, the creditor has a change of heart or suddenly needs $100, he cannot go to the borrower and demand the money. The term of the loan is one year. The borrower will not return it before the designated maturity date, before he had the full use of it, as contractually agreed. So the creditor’s $100 is “locked”, meaning that he has to wait one year before he could get back the principal and interest of his investment. His note, in financial jargon, must be “held to maturity”.

Thanks to the existence of capital markets, though, there is a way out for our creditor. He could sell his note there. What takes place in capital markets is the conversion of securities form of finance capital into money form. But these abstract concepts have as yet no meaning for us. For the time, simple buying and selling would do. So the creditor takes his IOU to market and presents it to a potential buyer, Moneybag.

– “How much are you asking for your note?”, asks Moneybag.

– “Well, the total amount due is $104”.

– “You have to stop trying to put one over us, my boy,” says Moneybag. “We the bond people are math savvy. Your note promises $104 1 year from now. Now is not "one year from now", if you know what I mean! You are selling your note today. The question before us is how much is the note worth today.”

We already know the answer. We only need to solve Eq. (1) for PV:

PV = FV/ (1+ i)

Substituting FV = $104 and i = .04, the PV of the promissory note is $100:

PV = $104/(1 + .04) = $100

We were expecting this result. In the absence of any change in the future cash flow, the term or the interest rate, the present value of the loan had to be what the creditor originally lent to the borrower.

Now, if Moneybag buys the note for $100, he would in fact be paying back the creditor and replacing him as the lender. The borrower need not even be aware of this change in his note's ownership. That is the critical function of financial and capital markets. They are the central pooling places for finance capital. In that regard, they provide capital at a scale beyond the reach of any single individual.

Note also the role of interest rate. If the rates rise to 5%, the creditor will not be able to get $100 for his note. Moneybag would pointedly remind him that he, Moneybag, could lend $100 with 5%, so he would be a fool to replace the creditor in a loan that only pays 4%. Under the new conditions, then, the creditor would have to accept less than $100 for his note. (Eq. 1) gives us the exact amount. We only have to remember that the future payment, $104, remains unchanged as that is all the borrower has agreed to pay. The overall rate, however, is now 5%. Substituting these into Eq. (1), we get:

PV = $104/(1 + .05) = $99.05

If the rates increase by 1%, the creditor will lose about 95 cents.

If the rate drops to 3%, the promissory note will be more valuable, as it pays 4% interest where others could only get 3%. The creditor will demand more for what, under the new circumstances, is a more profitable investment. The “extra” profit is 97 cents that we can calculate using Eq. (1):

PV = $104 /(1 + .03) = $100.97

This relation holds generally: Interest rates up, bond prices down, and vice versa. We see it in Eq. (1) as well. As interest rate i in the denominator of Eq. (1) increases, the present value of all promissory notes would decrease, and vice versa.

Eq. (1) is the fundamental relation of fixed-income mathematics, “fixed-income” being the universe of all the bills, notes, bonds, swaps, mortgages, accounts receivable, annuities – in short, any stream of future cash flows. The “mathematics” part is finding their present value , which should be the price at which the fixed income instruments is bought and sold.

You can take Eq. (1) and run amok. You could, for example, observe that a 1% increase in rates resulted in 95 cents fall in price while 1% decrease in rates resulted in 97 cents rise in price. So the price change of notes in response to a change in interest rates is not symmetric. You could spent a few years of your life studying the non-linearity of price-yield relations in bonds and then branch out and focus on the “convexity” issue, which is a second-derivative of sorts, dealing with the sensitivity of the sensitivity of price-yield relations in bonds.

Or, you could try to determine what happens if the borrower’s finances deteriorate. That, presumably, will increase the likelihood of the borrower's default, which should adversely affect the bond price.

Or, you could consider what would happen if the borrower could pay back his debt early. This “option” should obviously impact the bond price. That is a promising area of research worth a few hundred PhD dissertations on the subject of options adjusted bonds spreads/prices.

If you could do one or all these things, you would become a “quant”, a “rocket scientist”, a math wizard responsible for creating complex new products that would spearhead the globalization of finance. You could become a respected professor of finance at an Ivy League school of your choice. With a little luck, you might even receive a Nobel Prize in economics or become a policy maker at the Federal Reserve Board.

In short, in the realm of “mathematical finance”, you could be all you can be, and still understand absolutely nothing about finance, including its most fundamental relation in Eq. (1).

Let us look at it closely.

Eq. (1) belongs to a large class of physical, social and natural relations in the form of A = mB. These relations, without exceptions, have limits beyond which they are not valid. That is another way of saying that they are based on certain assumptions that limit their applicability. There is no ultimate equation of everything that is unconditionally valid across time and space.

Take, for example, Newton’s relation between force (F), mass (m) and acceleration (a), that is arguably the most profound relation in the universe. It states that

F = ma

The relation applies to all forces – gravity, electro-magnetic and weak and strong nuclear forces – and to all masses. In focusing on the seeming multiplicity of forces in nature and relating them to mass (matter), the equation defines the very discipline of physics which seeks to determine how the natural forces are related to one another and what is the nature of the matter. The equation is valid across the known universe, and helps plot the trajectory of satellites even outside the solar system.

Yet, it has limits. If force (F) increases, the acceleration (a) and, with it, the speed, will increase. But that is true only within “ordinary” speeds. As the speed approaches the speed of light, the mass also increases, countering the acceleration. At 300,000km/s, the relation is no longer valid. A different kind of physics governs.

What is the limit of PV = FV/ (1 + i)? That is, what are the assumptions and suppositions behind it?

First and foremost, this relation expresses a social relation, as evidenced by the presence of interest, i. That limits the applicability of the relation. Charging interest, for example, is forbidden in Islam. So in the Taleban controlled areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan, for example, Eq. (1) is not valid. If you try to enforce it, you would jeopardize your long term business prospects. Short term business prospects, too.

Shylock of The Merchant of Venice, by contrast, insists on interest. He lives by it. That is how relation (1) is a social relation, a product of historical development.

“That is an interesting observation, Mr. Saber. Very intellectual! But surely you realize that we do not live under the Taleban rule. We are citizens of Western liberal democracies where markets rule – the recent black eye they have gotten notwithstanding. So let us please focus on practical matters and leave the intellectual parts of finance to ivory tower academics.”

What else does Eq. (1) presuppose?

Wednesday, May 27, 2009

The Interest Rate Problem of the Federal Reserve

The “Bond Fears” in today’s Financial Times could be the epilogue to my 3-part series on the international monetary relations. (I do not provide a link because you need to subscribe to FT to read this particular article.) After pointing out that the yield on 10-year treasuries had gone up 26 basis points in two day, the article asks:
What’s going on? The fall in equities is scary but comprehensible. Not so with the bond sell-off … Fixed-income investors are now genuinely bewildered. The long-term trend, the latest inflation data, not to mention the experience in Japan, all point to lower yields. Buying by the Fed is another reason to favour bonds. But this latest sell-off, taken alongside the weakness of the dollar, suggests something far more terrifying is causing sleepless nights.
What is going on is this: The Fed is trying to resolve an economic crisis by means of technical maneuvers. Whether this is due to an “invincible faith in oneself”, a profound ignorance of economic relations or the absence of any other policy option, matters not. The result is the same. The bond yields are going up (and bond prices down) when the opposite is supposed to happen. That is how you know a force more powerful than the Fed’s is at work.

I will return with more on this.

Sunday, May 24, 2009

An Analysis of International Monetary Relations – Part 3: Where We Are Going

Hegel famously said that history repeats itself. Marx equally famously said that Hegel should have added: first time as a tragedy, the second time as a farce. Marx should have been more precise. History does not repeat itself only twice. It constantly “repeats” itself, each time at a qualitatively higher plane, corresponding to a progressively more developed stage of the society’s productive forces. Tragedy and farce are always present, farce being a tragedy brought on by the ignorance of self-assured men. That is why Hegel characterized the “invincible faith in oneself” as the chief quality of a comic character. As the societies advance, farce becomes more pronounced because the contradictions become more intensified.

***

This is an important point which I will take up in detail in Vol. 5 of Speculative Capital. Here, let me try to explain it with an example.

Take Holbein’s oil painting, The Ambassadors, which is a signature art work of the dawn of Capitalism.


What makes this 1533 work so contemporary is the pose and confident gaze of the two characters “at the camera”. The men stand next to the various artifacts – the “stuff”, in modern language – that represent wealth. But this is not the fixed wealth of old social orders. It is a dynamic wealth associated with international commerce – look at the globe and navigation equipment – and ultimately, the power of money. We are way past the barter trader here.

Except for the “distorted” skull in the foreground that was a common code then for the life’s transitory nature, there is no hint of irony in this painting. It is a serious work, as indicated by its title.

Now, look at the 1999 cover of Time Magazine in which Rubin, Greenspan and Summers are introduced as the saviors of the world.



This, too, is a serious picture; it could not be otherwise, portraying the three most eminent men of finance in the U.S. government on the cover of a prestigious weekly.

Yet, there is a teasing of sorts going on here. The caption – three men saving the world – is the deliberately exaggerated language of advertisers, like saying that BMW is the ultimate driving machine. It is an ad blurb that a modern reader is expected to recognize. The picture’s background, unlike in The Ambassadors, is austere. In fact, there is no background to speak of. The close-up shot merely makes Greenspan look like a three-headed hydra, albeit a smiling and friendly one. Heads contain brains, intelligence and ideas. All three men are closely associated with the globalization. And all three are at the pinnacle of power and prestige. That is what the picture is selling: the idea of the finance capital as the all-powerful savior of the world.

Of course, the reader does not quite buy that suggestion, in the same way that he does not believe a BMW is the ultimate driving machine even when he owns one. Neither do our “saviors”. Yet, the idea is pushed in earnest. That is a setup for farce. Rubin and Greenspan signal it by their grin; the celebrated genius Summers, by his discomfort and embarrassment at taking part in it.

***

The instigators a social farce are not harmless clowns. Charlie Chaplin understood this important point. His clowns make you laugh but he never allows you to forget that the buffoon who is amusing you is perfectly capable of doing serious harm. The word farce has a social connotation.

***

As a result of what has transpired in economic and financial relations between the countries in the past 30 odd years, Chinese are holding just under $2 trillion of USD-denominated assets, with half of that invested in the U.S. treasuries and agencies. These are the liabilities of the U.S. government, and the ability of the U.S. to extinguish them in such a way that Chinese and other creditors would not suffer is now the central issue of international finance.

On the surface, this circumstance appears similar to the late 1960s, when the European and Japanese central banks with large dollar reserves were expressing concern about the dollar’s convertibility to gold.

But setting aside the changed landscape of global politics and economics, there is a critical difference between now and then. The Bretton Woods crisis was about the ability of the U.S. to convert dollars to gold. The current issue is about the ability of the U.S. to “handle” its unsecured debt. Gold is out of the picture.

***

This is probably the closest I will come in this blog to giving trading and investment advice. But if you are concerned about the rise of inflation and would like to put your money into something “tangible”, stay away from gold. Gold is on its way to shedding its status as the universal money, as the universal depository of value. In coming years, if the price of gold increases, it will do so in its capacity as a metal, the way the price of iron or aluminum might increase.

Lenin said that after the world-wide establishment of Communism, gold would be used for furnishing public lavatories. He had this demonetization of gold in mind, a spectacularly theoretical notion that speculative capital brought to the realm of possible in a little over 30 years. This point is important. Gold is demonetized not because of the decision of this or that authority but as a result of a historical process that gave rise to speculative capital and “globalization”, and, at the same time, set the financial system on a path towards a systemic collapse.

The financial system could somehow be “repaired”, but there is no going back to gold. History does not repeat itself, in the sense of returning to where it was previously.

***

To prevent a complete meltdown, the U.S. government has pledged about $13 trillion in guarantees and actual payments to various entities, mostly financial institutions.

Then, there are the other, more persistent financial holes the U.S. government also has to plug. The Treasury must finance a $1.8 trillion budget deficit and a $1 trillion trade deficit through issuing bonds.

The tremendous demand for borrowing pushes the interest rates higher. To bring them lower, the Federal Reserve does “quantitative easing”, i.e., it buys the Treasuries. To pay for the purchase, the Fed creates money from thin air through an accounting entry; poof, and there is a trillion dollars.

No currency could withstand such persistent debasing and not lose its value. Hence, the Chinese's lingering unease about the weakness of the dollar.

But it is not the Chinese only. The recent G20 Conference in London this past March was the first economic/financial conference in the past century in which the U.S. not only did not set the agenda and dominate, but it was visibly relegated to the periphery. That more focus was placed on Michelle Obama’s fashion sense than her husband’s conference agenda said all there was to be said about the shape of the future to come.

***

Macro developments in economics and finance have a long horizon. They certainly do not happen overnight. The eddies of international finance, furthermore, produce transient effects; a weak dollar could temporarily appreciate against one, two or even all currencies. But the writing is on the wall: the dollar is on its way towards a structural depreciation against all major currencies, including yen. From there, the loss of its status as the main reserve currency will necessarily follow.

If this were the only bad news, it would be good news. But this is not your father’s monetary crisis.

***

The dollar became the world's money through its linkage to gold, which historically had that role. What made the linkage possible was the industrial might of the U.S. Without it, the U.S. could not have been in possession of the sufficient amount of gold – it would not have been in a position, period – to orchestrate the Bretton Woods system. Financial maneuvering and one-upmanship, even of the aggressive kind that Harry Dexter While pulled off at the Bretton Woods Conference, could not by themselves create a new world monetary order.

The linkage to gold provided a built-in frame of reference for the value of the dollar and its quantity in circulation; if the amount of dollars in circulation relative to the supply of gold increased, the dollar would be “weak”.

The breakdown of the Bretton Woods system did away with that frame of reference and, in doing so, set the stage for the expansion and subsequent ascent of finance capital.

The “ascent” meant that finance capital could claim a historically larger share of the country's newly produced value. That could only come at the expense of the industrial capital. So the ascent of finance capital was the beginning of the systematic weakening of industrial capital, that is to say, the systematic attack on the industrial base of the U.S. The destruction we are seeing in all spheres of economic activity is the result of this conceptual and yet very real conflict. The “system” in systemic collapse goes far beyond financial markets and institutions.

***

A complete analysis of the the relation between finance and industrial capital must await Vol. 4 of Speculative Capital. (That would be the “relation between Wall Street and ‘real economy’”, as it is commonly put because those who put it have no other way of putting it.) For now, an example should suffice.

Take any industrial corporation with a “finance arm”. Take, for example, GM and GM Acceptance Corporation, as the U.S. car companies have been on the news for the past 20 or so years.

The raison d'etre of a car company's finance arm in providing financing to car buyers is so they would not wait weeks for bank financing. Gradually, as this means towards selling cars becomes profitable, it become an end in itself, with the inevitable mission creep that follows. The following story captures this fateful reorientation.
The world’s biggest car company said Tuesday that it earned record second quarter earnings of $1.8 billion US on revenue of $48.7 billion ... General Motors Acceptance Corp., (GMAC), the car maker's financial services arm, contributed $395 million to its income.

The GMAC financial arm pulled in more profit in the second quarter, despite higher interest rates than in 1999 ... GMAC provides a variety of lending and insurance products. It recently became involved in commercial finance, full-service leasing and international mortgages.

We learn that: i) despite a difficult economic environment, the contribution of GMAC to GM's bottom line increased; and ii) GMAC is expanding to new areas, including mortgages.

Here is the result:
GMAC LLC, which provides loans to buyers of General Motors Corp vehicles, said its first-quarter loss grew 15 percent, reflecting an increase in soured mortgage and auto loans as the economy weakens.

But by far, the most pernicious impact of GMAC was in influencing the production cycle of the parent company. GMAC and other sister financing arms created the concept of “leasing” which implicitly assumed that the GM car buyers would get a new car every three years. The production cycle and car design was adjusted around that assumption. This is the ultimate example of production dog wagging the finance arm, with the results plain for everyone to see.

Car companies need not perennially be on verge of bankruptcy. Car companies could be, and the vast majority of them are, profitable.

***

The most pernicious damage of finance capital is the destruction of the “business model”. It initially creates a binge of easy profits and, in doing so, changes the organization of the enterprise in line with the “new”, finance-oriented model . Over time, the new model proves the instrument of undoing of the enterprise.

***

The U.S. industrial base remains formidable by any measure. But so is the scale of the destruction of the value. It is astounding how little effect almost $13 trillion in commitments and guarantees have had on the markets.

Meanwhile, the farce continues with clowns calling for the creation of a New American Century, as if bombast could be a substitute for economic might. In this way, they provide the surest evidence to date that the 21st Century is the American Century no more.

Wednesday, May 6, 2009

The Fault, Dear Brutus ...

Today, the Center for Public Integrity, a journalistic watchdog, published the results of its investigation into the causes of the subprime mortgage meltdown which precipitated the larger meltdown. The Financial Times headline summed up the gist of the report: Few escape blame over subprime explosion. The paper went on to say, quoting the report, that “almost every US power centre had a hand in lighting the fuse to the global meltdown”, and that:
Most of the top 25 originators, most of which are now bankrupt, were either owned or heavily financed by the nation’s largest banks, including Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, Wells Fargo, JPMorgan and Bank of America. Together, they originated $1,000bn in subprime mortgages in 2005-07, almost three quarters of the total.
These supposedly hard hitting reports are a monumental waste of time. If everyone is guilty, then no one is guilty. We learn nothing from them except a back-handed confirmation of our prejudice about the human fallibility. We are being preached an antisocial sermon.

Here is what I wrote in the opening paragraph of the 10-part Credit Woes series early in 2008 that began this blog.
The events leading to this seizure have been covered in detail from many perspectives but always within the same prescribed framework: the crisis as the culmination of a series of unfortunate events set in motion by (choose your emphasis) greedy traders, irresponsible lenders, foolish borrowers, sleeping-at-the-switch rating agencies and feeble regulators.

The focus on human element makes for good storytelling and has an evangelically uplifting bend that is appealing: If only the bad guys were to be replaced with good guys – something definitely in the realm of possible – the wrongs will be set right. The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but in ourselves!

Such takes on the crisis are not inaccurate; they are irrelevant. The subject matter of finance is not people; it is capital in circulation.
Go back and read the full series again. You will notice that against a background that shattered the most cherished beliefs, it has aged well. In fact, it has even improved with time, as all its “forward looking” statements have come to pass. That is the power of a correct theory, which is derived from the power of the truth. It is that relation, that correspondence, that stands the test of time.

Tuesday, May 5, 2009

A Humble Proposal For Reducing Speculation

“Of our time” description, when used for a poet, a writer or a philosopher, could have two distinct and opposite meanings. One is that of a fool who struts and frets his hour upon the stage but is nevertheless useful, the way an inanimate archeological object is useful, because in deciphering what he uncomprehendingly recorded we could learn about his time. The other is that of a knowing, perceptive observer who is conscious of the goings on around him and can therefore add to our knowledge with his observations and insights.

T.S. Eliot is a poet of our time strictly in the latter sense. He has an eye for the social ills as they affect individuals. Of particular interest to him is a large class of hollow men. Hollow man, as competently elaborated by Craig Raine in his study of T.S. Eliot, is “a physically damaged, confined soul, corroded by its own caution, a life disfigured and distorted, rusty with reluctance”.

This phenomenon, which is present at every age, especially stands out in modern times because it stands in contrast to, and in mockery of, the slogans of free men. The commonness and its uncomfortable implications are politely hidden in a neutral word: pragmatist. The pragmatist keeps a respectful distance from established prejudices and relations, follows the consensus and never, ever rocks the boat, no matter how urgently the boat might need a shakeup.

I thought of all this as I read last Thursday that the Federal Reserve was considering imposing a 3 percent penalty on failed treasury trades.

A fail trade is a trade that a short-seller fails to deliver. I wrote about short selling in detail last year in relation with the unraveling of money markets:
The sec lending market is driven by short selling, or shorting, which is selling something you do not have. Outside the financial markets, the practice amounts to fraud; if you sell a house, or a car, or a farm you do not have, you would probably go to jail. In the financial markets, the practice is legal and very common. With the ownership requirement eliminated, the buy-sell sequence could be reversed; instead of buying first and selling later, you could sell first and buy later.
In all events, the seller must deliver. Confronting him is a buyer who demands the security he just purchased. Since he himself does not have the security, the short-seller must borrow it or somehow find it in the market. When he fails to do so, in consequence of which he could not deliver the security to the buyer, we have a fail-to-deliver. It is this failure on which the Fed is imposing a 3% penalty. Here is part of the original story:
A Fed-endorsed industry recommendation will require traders to pay a three-percentage-point penalty on uncompleted trades, known as fails, starting tomorrow ... While the new recommendations are meant to curb disruptions caused when traders fail to meet their obligations, some strategists are concerned it may do more harm than good in the $7 trillion-a-day repurchase market, where dealers finance their holdings. A reduction in trading would be a setback for the Fed as it seeks to lower borrowing costs by pumping cash into the banking system and purchasing as much as $1.75 trillion in Treasuries and mortgage securities.
Let us set aside all distracting technical points and focus only on the core issue: short-selling U.S. treasury securities.

Buying treasuries is lending money to the U.S. government; you get an interest bearing security from the government, the government gets your cash. Selling treasuries you own is calling back your loan. You get your money back and a new lender to the government (who bought you treasuries) replaces you and your capital.

Selling treasuries you do not have is borrowing money as U.S. government. Only the U.S. government can borrow money as the U.S. government, in the same way that only the U.S government can print money. I discussed this point in Vol. 3 of Speculative Capital:
Yet another critical point went unnoticed: how could we short a riskless bond? Shorting a bond means borrowing money. In the yin yang of borrowing and lending, risk is defined with reference to lender only. As borrowers, we face no risk; we could take the lender’s money and run. Risklessness of the US Treasuries, likewise, refers to risklessness of these securities to their buyer – those who lend to the US government. The securities are riskless because the US government would not default. It then follows that only the US government can short a riskless bond, in the same way that only the US government can print money; we, as individuals cannot. It is astounding how often the difference between buying and selling, lending and borrowing escapes the attention of the finance scholars.

The closest equivalent to shorting treasuries is counterfeiting money. Failing to deliver short is selling counterfeit money that you do not even have! Yet everyone in the market treats it as a birthright.

Imposing 3% penalty on a small part of the market – the fails – is a timid and irresolute act. It will do nothing by way of improving markets no matter how you measure it.

The correct policy action would be to warn the “market participants” that a complete ban on short selling treasuries will be implemented in a few months and then on the designated day, pull the trigger. You will be surprised how quickly and extensively the speculative element will be flushed out of the markets.

Looking around, I expect this policy to be implemented in the morning after the Judgment Day.